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ABSTRACT 
Organizations rely on the honest operation of its members, but in an environment 
where individual members cannot be observed, the opportunity for individuals to lie can 
lead to dishonest choices (Grover, 1993). 
This thesis created and applied a computer-based Genetic Algorithm and Multi 
Agent System in order to test the predictions of Dr. Steven Grover’s distress-based model 
of the antecedents of lying in organizations.  Grover’s model blends self-interest theories 
and uses role theory to identify potential antecedents to lying.  The created system 
provided agents that encountered situations of distress such as those described by 
Grover’s model.  The agents’ actions were then observed and compared to Grover’s 
hypothesis that an individual’s skill will be inversely proportional to his frequency of 
lying. 
Social rationality has been shown to emerge in simple self-interested agents.  The 
hypothesis tested is that— in an environment where an organization and its members are 
independently self-interested — the frequency of organization members lying will be 
inversely proportional to the magnitude of feedback provided to the organization was 
tested. 
The results support both Grover’s hypothesis and the hypothesis on social 
rationality.  Self-interest individuals with higher skills lied less than individuals with 
lower skills.  Also, self-interested individuals lied less in the presence of a higher 
magnitude of negative organizational feedback. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis created and applied a computer-based Genetic Algorithm and Multi 
Agent System in order to test the predictions of Dr. Steven Grover’s distress-based model 
of the antecedents of lying in organizations.  Grover’s model blends self-interest theories 
and uses role theory to identify potential antecedents to lying.  The created system 
provided agents that encountered situations of distress such as those described by 
Grover’s model.  The agents’ actions were then observed and compared to Grover’s 
hypothesis that an individual’s skill will be inversely proportional to his frequency of 
lying. 
Social rationality has been shown to emerge in simple self-interested agents, and 
so the hypothesis that in an environment 1) where an organization and its members are 
independently self-interested and 2) where the organization receives merited negative 
feedback from its environment and 3) where workers cannot be observed or punished for 
lying, the frequency of organization members lying will be inversely proportional to the 
magnitude of that feedback. 
Three experiments were run.  The first experiment tested Grover’s hypothesis and 
collected data on the decisions of individuals of different skill levels.  The second 
experiment varied the magnitude of negative feedback that was provided to organizations 
and the frequency of individuals’ decisions to lie was recorded.  The third experiment 
involved running the computer model without variations or constraints and observing 
individuals’ skill levels and their decisions to lie. 
The results support both Grover’s hypothesis and the hypothesis on social 
rationality.  Self-interest individuals with higher skills lied less than individuals with 
lower skills.  Also, self-interested individuals lied less in the presence of a higher 
magnitude of negative organizational feedback. 
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1. Grover’s Model 
Professor Steven Grover derived a model of the antecedents of deception in 
organizations by combining two self-interest theories and role theory.  This model 
includes eight hypotheses to predict when individuals are likely to deceive, where 
deception is defined as a willful misrepresentation of the truth (Grover, 1993). 
The first self-interest theory used to derive the model is agency theory.  Agency 
theory is a theory of self-interest and is centered on the relationship of a principal and an 
agent.  In agency theory, the principal is defined as the party that delegates work to the 
agent party.  The agent party is defined as the party receiving and performing the work 
delegated by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Agents acting in self-interest behave in 
accordance with personal goals and to external rewards and punishments are received 
from a principal.  Agency theory also introduces information asymmetry, a situation 
where an agent has more information than his principal. Situations where the agent’s 
behavior cannot be observed might allow the agent to deceive the principal without 
penalty (Grover, 1993).   
The second self-interest theory, role theory, introduces the idea of role conflict. 
Role conflict is a situation where an agent holds multiple roles that may conflict, which 
might make satisfying these roles difficult or impossible.  A role is a set of actions or 
behaviors that a person uses to guide their behavior in a situation.1  Potential difficulty of 
satisfying conflicting roles can lead to psychological distress, causing the agent to seek 
ways to reduce the resultant dissonance.  Dissonance reducers include: 1) choice, where 
an agent behaves according to a dominating role and ignores the others, 2) avoidance, 
                                                 
1 Examples of roles and their respective environments include: the businessman when at work, the 
husband when at home or with family, and the host during a dinner party.  Multiple roles can be imposed 
simultaneously, and this can lead to conflict.  
 2
where the agent quits or no longer participates, 3) compromise, where the agent is able to 
satisfy both roles via a creative solution, and 4) deception, where the agent satisfies one 
role and misreports to the other role sender.  In the cases of choice and deception, the 
victim who is ignored or lied to will be the role sender2 who is the weakest. (Grover, 
1993). 
Grover’s integration of these two theories yields his proposed models of conflict 
and lying illustrated by Figure 1.  This figure shows the development of dissonance and 
its subsequent reduction during role conflict.  Upon role conflict, and individual’s 
characteristics influence the psychological distress of the individual.  Distress or 
dissonance must be reduced by the individual and can be accomplished in one of the four 
ways discussed previously.3 
 
Figure 1: Model of Individual Lying in Organizations (Grover, 1993) 
                                                 
2 A role sender is a person or other source of a role.  The role sender of the businessman could be a 
boss or superordinate.  The role sender of the husband might be culture or custom.  The strength of a role 
sender is the magnitude to which the individual feels compelled to satisfy roles from that role sender. 
3 The Voice option, which was not introduced and will not be explored in this thesis, is the ability of 
the individual to reduce dissonance by actually changing the requirements of roles.  For example, if the 
businessman and the husband are conflicting because the businessman must work late, but the husband 
must return home to spend time with his family, the Voice option might suggest that the businessman ask 
his boss to change his working hours so that he can satisfy his husband role and businessman role 
simultaneously. 
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Grover further develops this model into expected outcomes based on the 
dissonance reducers in Figure 2.  This figure shows that when one role sender is stronger 
than the other, “the individual is likely to choose to fulfill the stronger role at the expense 
of the weaker” (Grover, 1993).  This figure also illustrates Grover’s hypothesis that lying 
will occur only when the strengths of the role senders is near equivalence.  In cases where 
one role sender is significantly stronger than another, lying will not occur; instead, the 
individual will simply neglect the weaker role sender (the choice option). 
 
 
Figure 2: Influence of Role Strength on Lying and Victim Choice (Grover, 1993) 
Grover proposes the following hypotheses based on his integration of self-interest 
and role theory: 
Hypothesis 1.  Greater organization-individual value incongruity will be 
associated with higher frequency of lying to agents of the organization… 
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Hypothesis 2a.  Stronger organization values will be associated with less 
lying to agents of the organization.   
Hypothesis 2b.  Stronger individual values will be associated with more 
lying to agents of the organization… 
Hypothesis 3a.  Individual job skill will be negatively associated with 
lying to agents of the organization.   
Hypothesis 3b.  Time available to complete the task will be negatively 
associated with lying to agents of the organization. 
Hypothesis 4.  Higher performance expectations will be associated with 
higher incidence of lying to the sender of the performance expectation… 
Hypothesis 5.  Individuals holding more than one formal role within the 
organization are more likely to deceive the organization than individuals 
holding only one role… 
Hypothesis 6.  People who have role demands outside the organization are 
more likely to deceive the organization than those who do not hold such 
roles… 
Hypothesis 7.  The level of identification with a role will be inversely 
related to the likelihood of lying to the sender of that role… 
Hypothesis 8.  Workers reporting to more than one superior are more 
likely than those with a single superior to deceive a superior. 
(Grover, 1993) 
2. Social Rationality and the Golden Rule as Emergent Properties of 
Self-Interested Individuals 
Social rationality is a behavior or action of an individual that results in a joint 
social gain of a group of individuals.  Similar in concept of is the Golden Rule, which has 
been found to serve as a guide to an individual’s behavior in many circumstances.  The 
Golden Rule says: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”  The Golden 
Rule can be found in nearly all human cultures and even in non-human species (Pfaff, 
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2007).  Neuroscientist Donald Pfaff theorizes that the Golden Rule is hard-wired in 
human brains as “reciprocal altruism.” (Pfaff, 2007). 
Even in an environment motivated only by the concern for one’s self, the Golden 
Rule can be found.  Reciprocity has been shown to emerge in computer simulations that 
contain self-interested agents. Others have shown that social rationality can emerge from 
a collection of self-interested individuals.  A more thorough review of this phenomenon 
is provided in Chapter II. 
In an organization, it is not socially rational for individuals to lie.  Except in a few 
instances,4 deceit within organizations is harmful to the organization itself.  However, it 
might be individually rational for individuals to lie, depending on the policies of the 
organization.  Since individuals acting individually rational (as opposed to socially 
rational) would harm the organization and cause harm to the members of the 
organization, the presence of individual rationality might lead to social rationality under 
an environment where the most fit organizations and members survive. 
One of Grover’s hypotheses and the emergence of social rationality from self-
interested individuals will be explored in this thesis. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A computer model was built to test two hypotheses and simulated individuals who 
were not limited in their decision to lie or not lie.  The individuals were contained within 
organizations that competed in a free market industry. 
Hypothesis 3a of Grover’s model states that an individual’s job skill level is 
inversely related to the frequency with which that individual decides to lie.  This was 
tested in the computer model of this thesis by creating workers who had constant skill 
levels.  As the workers made decisions, their decisions to lie or not lie and skill level 
were recorded. 
                                                 
4 This thesis operates under the assumption that deception in the workplace is neither desirable nor 
helpful. 
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This thesis also explored the possibility of an emergent social rationality from 
self-interested agents, referred to as the Davis Hypothesis and defined as follows:  
Davis Hypothesis:  In an environment where 1) an organization and its 
members are independently self-interested, 2) the organization receives 
merited negative feedback from its environment, and 3) workers cannot be 
observed or punished for lying, the frequency of organization members 
lying will be inversely proportional to the magnitude of that feedback.  
Simply put, the practice of deception in an organization might be an end to itself, 
even if workers cannot be detected or directly punished.  The environment required by 
Grover’s model allows for this possibility to be tested.  The amount of negative feedback 
that an organizational entity would receive as a result of a lie told by a worker was varied 
over three permutations and the frequency of lies told by workers was recorded. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Models that predict behavior and represent real world phenomenon, such as 
Grover’s model of deception in the workplace, are well suited to be expressed in a 
computer model.  Computer models can rapidly explore a problem space and provide the 
means to observe the aggregate behavior and emergences of individuals.  Computer 
models can also produce large amounts of data quickly and inexpensively to increase 
statistical confidence. 
Since Grover’s model is one of deceit in the workplace, a model of a common 
workplace was created.  This workplace was a model of several organizations in a 
competitive free market.  Each organization was the home to several workers who were 
able to improve the value of raw materials.  Testing the Davis Hypothesis required an 
identical model. 
Three experiments were conducted.  The first experiment ran the computer model 
with parameters that prevented workers from being monitored5 by the organizations to 
test Grover’s hypothesis.  The second experiment was identical to the first except that the  
                                                 
5 The fact that a worker told a lie could actually be seen by his organization, but the parameters of the 
computer model prevented this observation from having any effect on the organization or on the untruthful 
worker.  Thus, as Grover’s hypotheses require it, the workers were unmonitored. 
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organization feedback mechanism was varied to test the Davis hypothesis.  The third 
experiment ran the model without these two constraints, which served as a comparison to 
a situation where behavior could be observed. 
1. Computational Modeling as a Valid Research Mechanism 
A model is any representation of a theory about a real-world phenomenon.  
Traditionally, models constructed out of a natural language have been used by social 
scientists, but for the past four decades, researchers in the social sciences have also been 
using computational modeling.  Computational models are comprised of a mixture of 
mathematics and algorithms.  While computational modeling itself does not require the 
use of computers, computers have proven to be effective computational modeling tools.  
Computer models6 are essentially theories rendered as computer programs (Taber & 
Timpone, 1996). 
Formal models7 have advantages over natural-language models because they can 
be precise, have clear assumptions, are easily internally validated, can take advantage of 
formal deduction, and can be unambiguously communicated among scientists.  The major 
advantage of computational models over formal mathematical models (such as a set of 
predictive equations, or Game Theory) is that while mathematical models easily suffer 
from oversimplification, computational models “greatly increase(s) the level of realism 
one may incorporate in a formal model without sacrificing analytic focus” (Taber & 
Timpone, 1996).  In past social science work, computational modeling has demonstrated 
its merits: the ability to allow for theoretical uncertainty when necessary, the ability to 
easily express complex theoretical concepts, and for the ability to combine the 
implications of several theoretical assumptions (Taber & Timpone, 1996). 
Computational modeling is especially well suited for modeling complex or 
“bottom up” processes even beyond the need for convergence and optimization, as is 
                                                 
6 Taber and Timpone use the term computational model to describe both a model comprising of 
mathematics and algorithms and a model written in computer instructions.  This thesis uses the term 
computational model to define a model comprising of mathematics and algorithms and the term computer 
model to describe a computational model written as computer instructions (a computer program). 
7 Taber and Timpone imply that computational models are formal models (Taber & Timpone, 1996). 
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required for empirical modeling.  Additionally, “one can induce theory from empirical 
work, represent this theory as a computational model, and generate new predictions  
from the model” (Taber & Timpone, 1996). 
2. Validation of the Computational Techniques Used in this Thesis 
This thesis employed an integration of two approaches to computational 
modeling, the Multi Agent System and the Genetic Algorithm. 
a. Multi Agent Systems 
A Multi Agent System (MAS) is a type of complex system with 
interacting agents.  The MAS approach to simulation is founded on the principle that 
groups of simple programs, or agents, that have simple rule sets can create and model 
complex behavior.  MASes can be observed throughout the real world: the streets are 
navigated by individual drivers; a free market economy contains individual consumers 
and suppliers; organizations are made of individual people.  Rush-hour traffic, the rise 
and fall of prices (Sowell, 2007), and lines in the company cafeteria are all complex 
aggregate phenomenon that occur as a result of individual decisions. 
In a MAS, an agent has three types of abilities: 1) he can receive 
information from his environment, 2) he can process that information and translate it into 
an action, and 3) he can perform an action that somehow affects his environment.  The 
agent may have multiple instances of each of these abilities. 
When multiple agents are placed in an environment, their actions affect 
their environment and, in turn, might affect other agents.  The aggregate behavior of the 
agents can become complex.  If a single agent is in the environment, his actions are 
somewhat predictable because of his simple rule set.  This is analogous to a single vehicle 
driving through a city’s streets.  In this situation, the vehicle’s environment (distance to a 
turn, maximum speed possible without collision, etc.) is constant or can be easily 
calculated or represented by a mathematical model.  If, however, the streets are full of 
other vehicles, a single vehicle’s environment is constantly changing, because it is 
affected by the actions of other vehicles.  Even in an environment as simple as a highway 
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becomes so complex that approaches as sophisticated as fluid and gas dynamics, 
servomechanisms, and network analysis have been used in attempts to describe its 
aggregate behavior (Chandler, Herman, & Montroll, 1958).  Such a complex environment 
cannot easily be modeled by mathematics alone (Taber & Timpone, 1996). 
A MAS was used in this thesis because, while a single individual’s actions 
based on self-interest might be easily determined with a mathematical model such as 
Game Theory, the real-world contains more than one individual.  Also, Game Theory 
requires perfect knowledge of not only one’s own payoffs, but the payoffs of one’s 
opposition (Krippendorff, 1986).  In a real-world scenario, multiple individuals are 
interacting simultaneously; therefore the environment is non-deterministic.  At the same 
time, the environment is not probabilistic because individuals do not make decisions 
purely randomly.  An environment that lies between being deterministic and probabilistic 
is considered to be complex, and MASes are able to model complexity. 
The utilization of a MAS also allows for aggregate patterns to emerge 
from simple agents.  It is assumed that in real-life situations agents will not be interacting 
with a principal in a vacuum, i.e. there will be other agents interacting with the same 
principal, and there will be other principals that interact with other agents.  Grover’s 
model is used to make predictions about human social behavior.  A model with multiple 
agents and multiple principals best reflect real-world conditions.  The interactions of 
simple agents who act in self-interest within a social system produce the emergent 
behaviors that might arise from such an environment.  These emergent behaviors are 
required to test the Davis Hypothesis. 
b. The Genetic Algorithm 
With computer models that involve many independent variables, 
exhaustive simulation techniques quickly become too large with current computing 
resources.  It is not possible to take a many-dimensional problem and test the entire 
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problem space in a reasonable amount of time8.  The Genetic Algorithm (GA), a 
technique developed by computer scientist John Holland (and used and tested by many 
others), has been shown to provide a good solution to this problem.  
The GA involves two steps: selection and mating.  Selection is a test of an 
individual’s fitness.  If the individual fails to pass this test, it dies.  The most fit survivors 
mate (Holland, 1992). 
Mating occurs between two individuals and consists of encoding, 
crossover, and mutation.  Each individual’s attributes are encoded into binary strings of 
equal length.  These strings are then laid in parallel, and at one or more crossover points 
the strings swap material.  The resulting strings are then mutated.  Mutation is a bit-wise 
function.  Each bit in the string has a chance to be mutated.  If a bit is mutated, it is 
simply flipped; a zero would become a one and vice-versa9.  The two resultant binary 
strings of this process are the “children” of the original strings. 
The children of all matings in a generation replace those individuals who 
died.  The individuals who did mate survive.  Individuals who survived but did not mate 
also survive.  All of these survivors make up the population of the next generation. 
This whole process of selection and mating is repeated for a number of 
generations. 
The GA has been found in many cases10 to be a good tool for exploring 
problems that have many variables, and thus which’s problem spaces are enormous 
(Holland, 1992).  While the GA does not test each permutation of a problem space 
explicitly, each permutation has the potential to be tested.  Many random instantiations 
give good initial coverage of the entire space, and each instantiation will converge on a 
                                                 
8 Axelrod’s prisoner’s dilemma had individuals whose decision table was only 70 binary characters 
long, but an exhaustive search for strategies in this simple individual would still take more than 100 times 
the current age of the universe at 100 strategies per second (Axelrod, 1997).  This thesis used agents with 
binary strings of length 86 and 320. 
9For example, if each bit has a 0.01 chance of being mutated, then about one in every 100 bits would 
be flipped.   
10 According to John Holland, these cases include jet engine design and gas pipeline system control 
(Holland, 1992). 
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local maximum present in the space (Axelrod, 1997).  The problem space of the model 
created to test Grover’s hypothesis and the Davis Hypothesis was large and complex. 
3. Method of Computational Technique Integration 
The computer model contained one environment, 12 organizations, and 96 
workers.  The environment, organizations, and workers were arranged as a MAS, in 
which organizations would compete with each other to buy raw resources and then resell 
them to the environment.  Each organization employed eight of the 96 workers. 
The GA was used within each organization as a means of adaptation for the 
workers, and it was also applied to the organizations.  To combat the development of 
superindividuals, the organizations were divided into three sections within which they 
competed11.  This reduced the influence of superindividuals. 
Because a MAS and GA were both used simultaneously, there are two domains 
that should not be confused. 
The first domain was that of the MAS.  This domain will be referred to as the 
External Environment.  There was only one External Environment.  The External 
Environment contained all of the organizations and their respective workers.  When 
organizations bought raw widgets and assigned them to the workers, and when the 
workers attempted to complete or lie about a task, the External Environment was in play.  
This environment provided no adaptation, but it allowed for the model to exhibit complex 
behaviors. 
The second domain was the domain of the GA, referred to as the Internal 
Environment.  There were 13 Internal Environments.  One Internal Environment held the 
organizational policies of each of the 12 organizations and will be referred to as the 
Organizational Internal Environment.  Another Internal Environment was for each 
organization’s workers, which will be referred to as the Co-Worker Internal 
                                                 
11 Under certain conditions, the GA will evolve superindividuals who have very high fitness, but who 
end up homogenizing the gene pool (Holland, 1992).  While some simulations desire this result, the goal of 
this experiment is to evolve agents who work well together.  Separating the organizations into three 
sections did lead to superindividuals within each section, but the organizations were then heterogeneous at 
the section-level.  
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Environment.  Each of the Co-Worker Internal Environments held a working strategy for 
each worker.  The purpose of the Organizational Internal Environment was to enable the 
organizations to develop organizational policies that were effective.  The purpose of the 
Co-Worker Internal Environment was to enable co-workers to develop effective working 
strategies. 
The External Environment and the Internal Environments did not operate in the 
same time domain.  The time units of the External Environment were the Round, Day, 
and Year, and will be discussed in Chapter III.  The time unit of the Internal Environment 
was the generation.  The difference between these time domains is analogous to the way 
an individual might develop his strategy in the game of Chess.  On each occasion of 
playing Chess, the individual plays with the current strategy (External Environment).  
After winning or losing several times12, the individual might modify his strategy (Internal 
Environment), and on the occasion of the next game he would use the new strategy. 
The External Environment provided input for the Internal Environment indirectly.  
During the events of the External Environment, each agent in the system earned a fitness 
score.  During the events of the Internal Environment, this fitness score was used. 
4. Brief Description of the Experiments 
The environment provided raw “widgets” for the organizations to purchase 
according to an elastic demand curve.  The organizations then could pass these raw 
widgets to their respective workers, who then had the choice to either 1) honestly attempt 
to complete the widget, 2) make the widget appear to be complete (deception), or 3) do 
nothing.  Organizations could then resell completed widgets at a price of their choice, and 
the environment bought the processed widgets based on price and quantity according to 
an elastic demand curve. 
                                                 
12 This is the detail of the analogy that results in two different time domains.  The strategy (Internal 
Environment) is developed in a different domain from the actual implementation (or acting out) of the 
strategy (External Environment). 
 13
The fitness of each organization was determined by the organization’s net 
monetary gain. The fitness of each worker was determined by the number of widgets that 
were (or appeared to have been) completed by the worker. 
The first experiment tested Grover’s hypothesis and involved the running of the 
model with parameters that prevented individuals from being punished or caught for 
lying.  The second experiment tested the Davis Hypothesis and ran the model in identical 
conditions, but it also varied the amount of feedback that was provided to the 
organizations.  The third experiment ran the model without any parameters that restricted 
the ability of an organization to detect and punish deception. 
The attributes and actions of each agent in the simulation were recorded. To test 
Grover’s hypotheses, the frequency of lying and the related task difficulty and individual 
skill levels were recorded and analyzed.  The frequency of lying was also recorded for the 
Davis Hypothesis, and the same data was collected in the third experiment. 
A Chi-Squared test was used to determine if there was any relationship between 
skill level and frequency of lying, and between skill level and task difficulty.  The data 
was then plotted to show the direction and strength of the relationship.  This same 
analysis was performed in the third experiment.  In experiment two, A Chi-Squared test 
was used to determine if a relationship between magnitude of organization feedback and 
frequency of lying.  This data was also plotted to show the direction and strength of the 
relationship. 
The results of all three experiments supported Grover’s hypothesis and the Davis 
Hypothesis.  Workers with higher skill levels lied less frequently, and a higher magnitude 
of feedback to the organizations reduced the frequency with which workers lied. 
D. SCOPE 
Grover’s model equates and interchangeably uses the terms lying, deception, and 
subterfuge (Grover, 1993).  He defines lying and further extends its domain to: 
 “A false statement made with the intent to deceive” is the definition of 
lying given by the Oxford English Dictionary, and it matches the 
definition adopted by social psychologists (DePaulo & DePaulo, 1989; 
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DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Ekman, 1985). The essential aspects of 
this definition are that the perpetrator knows the information is false, wants 
to mislead another person, and engages in the behavior proactively (Bok, 
1978).  Other than by lying, people can deceive by omitting facts or 
information, by presenting information in a certain order, or by framing 
statements to guide the listener away from the truth. 
(Grover, 1996) 
This thesis follows the same scope, definitions, and interchanges. 
In the computer model, lying was represented by a worker’s decision to 
untruthfully indicate that tasks assigned to him were completed.  In addition to lying, the 
worker had the choice to either 1) complete the task13, or 2) not attempt to complete the 
task and indicate to the organization that the task was not completed.  An attempt to lie 
about a task completion was done with 100% probability of success, whereas an attempt 
to truthfully complete a task might have had a lower probability of success.  Decisions to 
do nothing were also performed with 100% success. 
Grover’s hypothesis 3a requires that a model of individual skill levels be present.  
The computer model represented individual skill level by giving each individual in the 
model a random set of skills to complete different types of tasks.  In the model, there are 
three types of tasks and each individual has a skill level that corresponds to each of these 
types of tasks.  Skill level is modeled by defining with what probability of success an 
individual can complete a task of the corresponding type.  Higher-skilled individuals 
have a higher probability of success, and lower-skilled individuals have a lower 
probability of success.  The range of probabilities of success was approximately normally 
distributed between zero and one, inclusive. 
The scope of the virtual environment included several organizations and their 
workers.  Throughout this thesis, the terms “task”, “widget” and “product” are used 
interchangeably to mean a unit of work that can 1) be attempted and improved by a 
worker, and 2) bought, sold, and inspected by an organization. 
                                                 
13 Or make the task appear to be complete (deception). 
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Organizations were not allowed to interact with one another.  An Organization 
could only interact with its own workers, and with the single environment.  Interaction 
with the environment was limited to 1) the buying of raw materials, 2) the selling of 
processed products, and 3) the refunding of money earned from products that were 
determined to be defective by the environment.  Organizations were allowed to assign 
tasks to workers and receive complete or incomplete tasks.  Organizations were also 
allowed to buy the tasks from the environment, inspect them14, and sell them. 
Workers could not interact with one another.  Workers could only interact with 
their organization.  Workers were only allowed to receive tasks and return complete or 
incomplete tasks.  With regard to the tasks, workers were only allowed to make one of 
three choices: 1) attempt to complete the task honestly, 2) make the task appear to be 
completed (be dishonest), or 3) do nothing. 
Tasks (or widgets) could only be handled by a single organization and a single 
worker.  Widgets could only be assigned once, regardless of a worker’s action or 
inaction.  There was no opportunity for rework.  Each widget was of one of the three 
types, and this type was constant. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis will provide a brief literature review of psychology and self-interest 
theories as they relate to Grover’s model.  The review closely follows Grover’s literature 
review, but it also introduces a few topics not covered by Grover during his development 
of his model.  The review also provides information on social rationality and the 
workplace. 
A Chapter on system design will provide detailed specifications of the computer 
model that was built.  This Chapter will also provide justification for the design 
parameters and other design decisions that were included in the computer model, as well 
as their relevance to Grover’s model and the Davis Hypotheses. 
                                                 
14 Experiments one and two did not allow tasks/widgets to be inspected.  Grover’s and Davis’ 
hypotheses require that workers not be monitored.  Experiment three allowed organizations to discover and 
punish lying workers for a price. 
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The fourth Chapter will provide verification results for the computer model that 
was designed in this thesis.  Experiment details and analysis of their data will also be 
provided. 
The thesis will conclude with a summary and explanation of the results, as well as 
recommendations for future study. 
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II. THEORY BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Grover has indicated the importance of studying deceit in the workplace: 
People have ample opportunity to either lie or tell the truth in the course of 
their work. Workers continually report their behavior and give information 
to peers, superordinates, and others, in written form, orally, and 
nonverbally. The truck driver records the number of hours on the road, the 
nurse charts vital signs, the certified public accountant states what has 
been audited, and the forester reports a tree census. Organizations 
generally rely on these reports to be honest. However, each of these 
individuals may have reasons to lie. The truck driver returns home sooner 
if he says he drove the speed limit when in fact he exceeded it; the nurse 
may not have time to actually observe vital signs that must be recorded; 
CPA's may gain partner status by exaggerating their work quantity; and 
the forester may misreport the tree census to prevent deforestation. 
Dishonesty in the workplace has implications for how organizations 
function and therefore demands theoretical attention. 
(Grover, 1993) 
This Chapter will establish some of the previous research done in the field of 
lying as it relates to its motivations and origins.  Most of the background is congruent 
with the background theory cited by Grover in the construction of his model.  This 
Chapter will also provide some background information on social rationality and its 
relevance to the workplace and the Davis hypothesis. 
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B. PSYCHOLOGY 
Grover begins his literature review with some background on lying and deceit as 
related to psychology: 
Psychologists who have studied lying include Hartshorne and May (1928), 
who conducted a series of studies investigating lying, stealing, and 
cheating. "The results of these studies show that neither deceit nor its 
opposite, 'honesty,' are unified character traits, but rather specific 
functions of life situations" (Hartshorne and May 1928, p. 411). Other 
psychologists have examined the nonverbal cues of deceit, finding that 
few untrained people can discern liars from tellers of the truth (Bond, 
Kahler, and Paolicelli 1985; DePaulo and Pfeifer 1986; Ekman 1985; 
Riggio and Friedman 1983; Zuckerman, Koestner and Alton 1984). The 
psychology literature therefore suggests that the difficulty with which 
deception can be identified and the lack of a trait to explain lying provides 
ample opportunity for lying in organizations. 
(Grover, 1993) 
1. Lying as Commonplace 
At least one study has shown that people lie as a part of everyday life.  DePaulo, 
et al.’s study of 1996 examined different groups of people that recorded when they told 
lies.  Most often people reported telling lies about “their feelings; their actions, plans, and 
whereabouts; and their achievements and knowledge” (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Kashy, 
Epstein, & Wyer, 1996).   
This study also gathered data about how people felt before, during, and after lie-
telling in terms of distress.  The study observed that before a lie, the participant was only 
under a small amount of distress and that after a lie the distress was not significantly 
reduced.  More distress was reported during the actual telling of the lie, and some of this 
distress lingered.  However, “for more than 70% of the lies in both samples, participants 
said that if they could relive the situation, they would tell the lie again” and they 
“…claimed that both they and the targets of their lies would have felt a bit worse if the 
truth had been told instead of the lie”(DePaulo et al., 1996). 
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Lies! Lies!! Lies!!!: The Psychology of Deceit by Charles Ford addresses the 
paradoxical nature of lie-telling:  There are many situations where lies are a social or 
cultural expectation, and others where lies are frowned upon.  “The ability to lie, and to 
tell when a lie is needed, are fundamental human skills. Whereas those who lie too much 
are considered unreliable, those who lie too little are labeled tactless” (Price, 1996). 
2. Lying in a Western Business Culture 
Grover established that lie-telling in a business environment is very different than 
lying in everyday life.  Traditionally, the modern capitalist business culture is concerned 
with the effects of lying and fraud on business.  In a casual observation, a common 
database was searched for the terms “ethics” and then for “business [and] ethics.”  Nearly 
40% of the results in the entire “ethics” result set also contained the word “business”15.  
Grover also alludes to ethics as a significant concern to businesses (Grover, 1993), 
(Grover & Chun Hui, 1994). 
The Journal of Business Ethics cites examples of businesses such as Enron and 
WorldCom, whose deceitful practices “helped to fuel a massive loss of confidence in the 
integrity of American business and have contributed to a very sharp decline in the U.S. 
stock market” (Carson, 2003). 
3. Role Theory 
Role theory is based on the concept that an individual belongs to several types or 
images which guide his actions.  A role is an image to which the individual strives to 
achieve congruence.  Role enactment is the degree to which a person acts out a role 
appropriately (Solomon, Surprenant, Czepiel, & Gutman, 1985).  For example, a 40-year-
old man who works for a large company might hold the roles of businessman, friend, 
                                                 
15 The author made this observation by using the common search engine Google as well as Google’s 
Scholar (Beta) database, which searches scholarly publications.  In Google Scholar, the term “ethics” 
returned about 2,690,000 results, and the term “business [and] ethics” returned 1,040,000 (“everyday [and] 
ethics” returned 190,000, and “common [and] ethics” returned 1,360,000 results).  In Google’s normal Web 
search, “ethics” returned 93,600,000 and “business [and] ethics” returned 16,200,000 (“everyday [and] 
ethics” returned 439,000, and “common [and] ethics” returned 2,252,000).  These queries were made in 
June of 2008. 
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husband, golfer, and father.  Depending on his situation, the man identifies himself with 
the appropriate role and attempts to appropriately fulfill that role.  He would act 
differently with his buddies on the golf course than he would with his daughter at bed 
time. 
As Grover reports, role conflict is a situation where multiple roles are appropriate, 
but the actions of the roles do not allow for mutual satisfaction.  For example, the 
businessman is always prepared for next-day meetings, but the husband and father always 
spends time with his family during the evenings.  These conflicting role demands can 
lead to psychological distress.  Alleviation of this distress can be achieved by both 
choosing one role and ignoring the others, avoiding role conflicts, or by compromising 
between the demanding roles (Grover, 1993). 
C. SELF-INTEREST THEORIES 
Grover also addresses self-interest: 
The theory and research on deception and ethics in business has 
predominantly used the self-interest notion to explain deception. The 
organizational politics literature suggests that people may deceive in order 
to control resources, conceptualizing resource control as a self-interest 
commodity. Schein (1979) theorized that people use deception to attain 
power, especially in high slack organizations, where personal power may 
be readily pursued under the guise of organizational benefit. 
(Grover, 1993) 
1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory is a type of self-interest theory, and it is based on an agent’s 
relationship to his principal.  The principal is defined as the party that delegates work to 
the agent party.  The agent party is defined as the party receiving and performing the 
work delegated by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in 
agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) 
the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult  
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or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has 
behaved appropriately. 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) 
2. Ethical Ambivalence Theory 
In attempts to reduce the problems associated with the agency-principal 
relationship, organizations might introduce feedback to workers.  This can communicate 
the values of the organization to the workers.  When done perfectly, the worker would be 
provided feedback that guided his actions towards the goals of the organization.  
However, in an environment that is very complicated the practice of providing feedback 
might not be perfect, and ethical ambivalence can emerge. 
Ethical ambivalence is a form of sociological ambivalence in which (a) the 
behaviors, attitudes, and norms that are shaped and maintained by the 
organizational reward system conflict with (b) the behaviors, attitudes, and 
norms congruent with the ethical values and judgments of organizational 
… classes of individuals who have a vested interest in the outcomes of 
actions and the solutions of problems.  
(Jansen & Mary Ann Von Glinow, 1985) 
Organizational reward systems can be a source of ethical ambivalence to its 
members.  In the academic community, openness and access to methods or research and 
experimentation are essential to the advancement of knowledge.  However, business 
sponsorship of academic researchers can lead to “norms of secrecy that support 
knowledge as private property” (Jansen & Mary Ann Von Glinow, 1985). 
In this example, the academic community underwent a change in reward system. 
Researchers were now rewarded for secrecy, or rather, secrecy served as a safeguard 
from “later involvements in priority disputes” (Jansen & Mary Ann Von Glinow, 1985).  
It might be safely assumed that, if increased knowledge is beneficial to business 
sponsors, any hindrance to its progress would not be in the best interest of the business.  
Thus, the effect of loss of information as a result of secrecy is probably not intended.  
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This misalignment of reward structures and desired results is a key point of Grover’s 
model development: 
Goal conflict and self-interest also operate in Jansen and Von Glinow's 
(1985) theory of ethical ambivalence, which states that behaviors 
rewarded by the organization may be at odds with those expected by some 
organizational stakeholders. Unethical behavior therefore may 
unintentionally result from inappropriate reward systems. That is, 
employees may engage in unethical behavior because that unethical 
behavior, rather than the expected behavior, is rewarded. 
(Grover, 1993) 
The computer model built in this thesis allowed for ethical ambivalence to arise 
by allowing Organizations to adapt their own reward and penalty structure.  These 
structures are explained in Chapter III. 
3. Grover’s Proposed Limitations 
Grover has identified several reasons why self-interest theories are not sufficient 
to explain deception in the workplace.  His first reason is that self-interest theories 
“presuppose that individuals have the ability to predict and weigh the differential values 
of a variety of outcomes,” and that organizational reinforcements might be unclear or too 
complex (Grover, 1993).  Grover reports that another problem is that some individuals 
may not be acting out of self-interest, but out of selflessness or altruism.  Also, certain 
lies may be prosocially motivated, such as the engineer who wants to complete more 
safety tests and so lies, saying that required testing (that had actually already been 
completed) had not yet been completed.  By lying, he may have acted prosocially to 
make a safer product (Grover, 1993). 
D. SOCIAL RATIONALITY 
Grover agrees with researchers who theorize that self-interest cannot explain 
instances of deception because some people act altruistically or selflessly.  In contrast, 
other research in neuroscience and cooperation suggest that altruism and selflessness are 
actually products of self-interest. 
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The Golden Rule says: “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”  
This rule is almost universally accepted as a moral compass and is considered natural 
moral law (Cunningham, 1998).  The Golden Rule can be found in the philosophy of 
Confucius, Islam, Christianity, Plato, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Immanuel Kant. It is 
even found in non-human species ranging from primates to insects (Pfaff, 2007).  The 
Golden Rule is the foundation of moralistic trust (Cunningham, 1998), and neuroscientist 
Donald Pfaff theorizes that this trust is hard-wired in human brains as “reciprocal 
altruism.” Whether instinctive or not, patterns of reciprocity and mutual trust are 
observed in the real world (Pfaff, 2007). 
1. Cooperation Emerging from Self-Interest 
Even in an environment motivated only by the concern for one’s self, the Golden 
Rule can be found.  Reciprocity has been shown to emerge in an iterated game of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, a game played by two people, each of whom individually makes a 
decision to cooperate or defect for a predetermined amount of points (Axelrod, 1997). 
Although an individual can earn more points in the short run by defecting, as both players 
defect more frequently the individual gains diminish.  Eventually, both players learn that 
cooperating, while only moderately beneficial in the short run, is a more effective 
strategy in the long run.  
Table 1.   Payoff matrix for Axelrod's prisoner's dilemma 
 Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 3/3 0/5 
Defect 5/0 1/1 
 
2. Social Rationality Emerging from Self-Interest 
Dr. Bruce Edmonds has performed many experiments that explore social 
intelligence emerging from evolutionary processes and social simulations.  In several of 
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these experiments, he and Dr. David Hales have shown that social rationality (and some 
might argue altruism) can emerge from a collection of self-interested individuals who are 
subject to an evolutionary process or algorithm.  In their 2002 experiments, Edmonds and 
Hales predicted that “If a socially rational agent can perform an action whose joint 
benefit is greater than its joint loss, then it may select that action” (Hales & Edmonds, 
2003).  In their M3 model, they found that the majority of individuals (under most 
circumstances) will perform actions to help others, even if those actions immediately 
result in an individual penalty (Hales & Edmonds, 2003).  A chart of this trend is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A chart of data from Edmonds' and Hales' M3 model show that individuals 
acting out of self-interest usually behaved socially rationally (Hales & Edmonds, 2003) 
3. Social Rationality in Economics 
Economies are examples of complicated environments in which individuals act 
out of self-interest.  The classic El Farol Problem16 utilizes very simple individuals that 
                                                 
16 This is a classic economics problem.  There is a bar that plays great music every Thursday night, but 
the bar is small and easily overcrowded.  A good night is when the bar is not overcrowded (60% of the total 
population of potential attendees is considered to be a comfortable capacity), and a bad night is when the 
bar is overcrowded.  The goal of each potential attendee is to attend El Farol on a good night.  Each time an 
individual attends on a good night, they take a bonus to happiness.  A penalty to happiness is awarded if the 
individual attends on a bad night. 
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act out of self-interest, and many have shown that over time individuals reach equilibrium 
behaviors (Arthur, 1994) (Edmonds, 1999b).  Figure 4 illustrates how quickly individuals 
in an El Farol experiment can reach a social equilibrium that approximates the 








Figure 5: Development of individual strategies in an El Farol experiment (Edmonds, 
1999b) 
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Thomas Sowell describes an economic situation in the real-world.  He describes 
the evolution of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the United States during the 
industrialization of the automobile industry.  One of the purposes of the labor union was 
to ensure that auto workers’ working conditions were safe and more comfortable, as well 
as to fight for the desires of the auto workers, which was usually the standard of payment, 
benefits, and available labor hours.  As the UAW achieved more for its members, the 
effect was a natural rise in the operating costs of automobile makers because they had to 
pay higher wages and spend more on improving and maintaining working conditions.  
When foreign automobile makers, who did not allow the formation of labor unions, 
began to enter the US market, domestic automobile makers began to experience loss of 
sales and eventually significant financial trouble because the foreign auto makers were 
able to sell cars cheaper.  The financial stress of US automobile makers forced them to 
find ways of cutting costs, and that led to the firing of hundreds of thousands of members 
(and non-members) of the UAW(Sowell, 2007). 
It was the self-interest of the members of the UAW, then, that led to fewer jobs 
and was therefore detrimental to UAW members.  The goal of the UAW was to improve 
the condition of auto workers, but in reality it harmed them (Sowell, 2007).  While the 
self-interest of the UAW (better working conditions and higher pay) was different that 
the self-interest of the auto makers (better profits), it has become apparent that their 
survival and prosperity requires cooperation. 
Modern labor unions have realized the need for cooperation with employers.  
Today, instead of being insensitive to the competitive market environment, labor unions 
understand the need to keep their employers profitable and surviving, even if it means 
lower wages, fewer benefits, and less luxurious working conditions (Sowell, 2007).  This 
adaptation of the labor unions and automobile makers in the United States demonstrates 
how individual self-interest can lead to social rationality. 
E. CONCLUSION 
By integrating self-interest and role theory, Grover’s model utilizes the 
advantages of both theories with regard to their explanations of why people might lie.  
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Grover’s position is that neither self-interest nor psychological distress can individually 
explain a person’s decision to lie.  The purely self-interested agent (according to agency 
theory) only acts with the information that is perfectly knowable.  Conflicting or overly 
demanding roles can lead to role conflict and distress.  This distress can be alleviated by a 
compromise or by neglecting all but one role.  These methods can be implemented by a 
lie, but to determine which role would be neglected or supported cannot be determined; it 
requires self-interest. 
The model built in this thesis was able to incorporate the key theories of self-
interest and role theory.  Individual agents of the model acted in self-interest, and their 
actions and interactions provided role demands. 
Just as the UAW’s self-interest led to a significant decline in the welfare of its 
members, the Davis hypothesis suggests that the practice of deceit in an organization 
actually leads to a reduction in the practice of deceit, even if the deceivers are not directly 
punished. The use of multiple agents in an economic setting allows the complexity of 
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III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The computer model built in this thesis was a compound MAS (External 
Environment) that used the GA to give agents the ability to adapt (Internal Environment).  
There were two types of agents: Organization agents and Worker agents.  The 
Organization agents were placed in a static17 Market Environment object.  The 
Organization agents interacted with the Market Environment, and their interactions 
affected one another indirectly by modifying the Market Environment.  Eight Worker 
agents were placed in each Organization agent, and each Worker interacted with his 
Organization. 
The GA was applied to populations of Organization agents and Worker agents.  
Organization agents contained a gene string that dictated certain behaviors and policies of 
the organization.  Worker agents contained a gene string that dictated actions to be taken 
for each possible assignment situation18. 
Figure 6 illustrates a high-level view of the computer simulation.  Figure 7 is a 
depiction of a single Organization. 
                                                 
17 Here, the term static means that the Market Environment was not adaptive and its attributes did not 
change. 
18 Zero, one, two, or three Widgets could be assigned at any one time.  There were four Widget types, 




Figure 6: A top-level view of the computer model 
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B. TOPVIEW 
The External Environment had three temporal components: the Year, the Day, 
and the Round.  There were six Rounds in a Day, two Days in a Year, and 50 Years in a 
trial19.  Each of these temporal components will be defined in this sub-section. 
1. The Year 
A Year contained two Days and the Organizational Internal Environment events.  
During the Organizational Internal Environment events, the GA was applied to the 
Organization gene pools, which allowed them to adapt.  Each Organization had a chance 
to mate that was based on its net monetary flow.  Organizations that had a higher net gain 
had more chances to mate each Year. 
Both the Organizations and the Workers adapted (during their respective Internal 
Environment events) to a “moving target20.”  This approach was taken by Axelrod’s 
iterated prisoner’s dilemma, and his results showed that after an initial period of 
turbulence, individuals would still be able to adapt21.  Axelrod discussed the tendency for 
individuals under a GA to become less random and mobile after a few generations, and 
that this phenomenon may also help to stabilize such a complex environment (Axelrod, 
                                                 
19 These were the numbers for the experiments run, and they are simple parameters that can be passed 
with different values to the computer model.  These particular inputs were chosen because: six Rounds 
amplifies the difference between Workers’ decisions (because those decisions are made six times) and 
makes it possible for each Raw Widget to be completed with ten Workers; two Days allows successful 
Workers the opportunity to try previously successful decisions again; 50 Years allows for 50 generations of 
the Organizational Internal Environment and 100 generations of the Co-Worker Internal Environment.  
Axelrod ran his prisoner’s dilemma for 50 generations, although he saw peak performance after about 35 
and observed a decline in average fitness until about the 9th generation (Axelrod, 1997).  Also, early 
observations of the model also provided sufficient performance and adaptation around 35 generations.  
Since all data in this thesis, regardless of generation, was used in analysis, more generations helped to 
reduce noise associated with the initial turbulence and randomness associated with the first 10 or so 
generations. 
20 This is opposed to a condition where the Organization agents would not adapt or change at all, and 
the Worker agents would be the only agents adapting.  This “non-moving target” approach is significantly 
less complex, but neither allows for the exploration of an Organization’s behavior nor represents reality 
very accurately. 
21 As opposed to the supposed alternative, in which the agents would be required to adapt so fast that 
they could not adapt and the entire simulation would be random and chaotic. 
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1997).  It was found in early testing and observation that both the Organizations and the 
Workers could adapt simultaneously and still show progressive adaptation.  
2. The Day 
A Day contained six External Environment events (steps 1-6), and the Co-Worker 
Internal Environment events (step 7): 
1. New Raw Widgets were instantiated 
2. Raw Widgets were sold to bidding Organizations 
3. The Round begins and ends 
4. Completed Widgets were sold by Organizations to the Market 
Environment 
5. An Organization’s unsold Widgets were destroyed 
6. The Market Environment had a chance to inspect recently 
purchased Widgets and return Falsified Widgets for a refund 
7. The GA was applied to the Worker gene pools (Co-Worker 
Internal Environment events begin and end) 
A Worker’s fitness was determined by his choices during the Round (part of the 
External Environment) and by the Organization’s rewards and penalties policies22.  In 
general, Workers who Completed more Widgets usually had a higher fitness.  This fitness 
was then used by the Co-Worker Internal Environment events to adapt the Workers. 
3. The Round 
A Day contained six rounds.  Each Round operated only in the External 
Environment.  The Round was an opportunity for the Organizations to take recently 
purchased Raw Widgets and assign them to Workers.  Up to three Widgets of any 
combination of types could be assigned to a Worker each round.  After assignment, 
                                                 
22 Rewards and penalties policies were only effective during experiment three. 
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Workers had the opportunity to interact with the Widgets and could attempt to 1) 
Complete, 2) Falsify or 3) Do Nothing to the Widgets.  The Widgets were then returned 
to the Organization, which might have conducted spot checking for Falsified Widgets23. 
4. The Step 
Each time a Worker was given an assignment of Widgets, he was given exactly 
four steps24 to complete his tasks.  Each step, the Worker made a decision.  If no 
tasks/Widgets remained before the conclusion of the four steps, the stepping process was 
ended. 
C. THE MULTI AGENT SYSTEM 
The objects in the MAS included Widgets, Worker agents, Organization agents, 
and the Market Environment. 
1. The Widget 
Widget objects represented goods that could be 1) purchased raw, 2) improved, 
and 3) resold. Widgets provided Organization agents a way to earn revenue.  Worker 
agents Completed, Falsified, or Did Nothing to Widgets to earn performance feedback 
from Organization agents. 
a. Widget Attributes 
Each Widget object had two key Boolean attributes.  The first was the 
“complete” attribute, and the second was the “honestly_done” attribute.  The 
combinations of these two Boolean attributes defined the possible states of a Widget.  
Table 2 shows the possible states of the Widget object. 
                                                 
23 Spot checking was only effective in experiment three. 
24.This aspect of the model was one of the few decisions in which definition could not be changed or 
tweaked after the beginning of software development.  Other such decisions were: there were three types of 
Widgets, type A, type B, and type C; an Organization may assign up to three Widgets of any combination 
of types. 
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Table 2.   States of the Widget object 
Actual 
State 
State as perceived by 
Organization objects 
“complete” flag value “honestly_done” flag 
value 
Raw25 Raw False True 
Complete Complete True True 
Falsified Complete False False 
 
Widget objects also had four other attributes, listed in Table 3.  The “type” 
attribute defined the Widget object as one of three types of Widget.  Different Workers 
had different skill abilities to Complete a Widget, and this ability was specific to the 
Widget’s type. The “p_success_lie” was a value between zero and one (inclusive) and 
represented the probability that a Worker attempting to Falsify this particular Widget 
object would succeed.  “p_success_lie” was set to one for all experiments. 
The “time_spoiling” and “time_consumed” attributes held integer values 
that told an observer how long a particular Widget had either 1) been waiting in the 
Market Environment for an Organization to purchase it (spoiling) or 2) how long, after 
being sold back to the Market Environment, it has been consumed.  These values were 
used by the Market Environment to determine when a Widget would be removed from 
 
the simulation.  For the experiments in this thesis, Raw Widgets spoiled after one day of 
not being purchased by an Organization and were consumed after one day after being 
resold to the Market Environment. 
                                                 
25 A Raw Widget is equivalent to an incomplete Widget.  Widgets not Completed or Falsified remain 
Raw. 
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Table 3.   Other Widget attribute values and purpose 
Attribute Possible Values Purpose 
type “A”, “B”, or “C” Defines the type of the Widget object, which is 
used to provide different levels of difficulty. 
p_success_lie {0 1}value∩ ≤ ≤\ Dictates the p(success) of an attempt to Falsify. 
time_spoiling {0 }value∩ ≤]  Represents the amount of time a Widget has 
been waiting to be purchased by an Organization 
time_consumed {0 }value∩ ≤]  Represents the amount of time a Widget has 
been in the Market Environment after having 
been resold to the Market Environment by an 
Organization 
b. Important Widget Methods 
Each Widget had three important methods, listed in Table 4.  These 
methods represented an interaction between a Worker and a Widget object.  To make an 
honest attempt at Completing a Widget, a Worker would call the “honest_attempt” 
method.  The Worker provided his skill, represented by a p(success).  If successful, the 
Widget’s state would change to Complete.  To attempt to Falsify a Widget, a Worker 
would call the “attempt_to_decieve” method.  If successful, the Widget’s state would be 
changed to Falisifed.  Workers were required to interact with Widgets, so the 
“do_nothing” method represented a Worker’s choice to take no action26, or to keep the 
Widget in the Raw state. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Because the GA is used to adapt the Worker’s decisions (and because a technique was used to 
reduce the size of the working decision table to make the size of a Worker’s binary string manageable), it 
was possible (and quite frequent) for Workers to “misfire”, i.e. to indicate that an action for a certain type 
of Widget be taken, but to then find that no Widget of the indicated type was available.  Misfires simply 
fizzle, and were effectively decisions to “do_nothing” which were analyzed as such. 
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Table 4.   Important Widget methods 
Method Input Potential Widget State Affect 
honest_attempt {0 1}value∩ ≤ ≤\  If successful, can change from Raw to 
Complete 
attempt_to_deceive None If successful, can change from Raw to 
Falsified 
do_nothing None None 
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Figure 7: A view of a single Organization 
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2. The Worker 
The Worker object was an agent that represented an individual person in an 
Organization.  The goal of each Worker was to survive, and fitness for survival was 
determined by the Worker’s actions with regard to interacting with Widgets.  In general, 
a Worker that transformed more Widgets into the Complete state than another would 
have a higher fitness 27. 
Each Worker object had six attributes, listed in Table 5.  Three of the 
attributes represented a Worker’s skill or ability to transform Raw Widgets into Complete 
Widgets.  The fourth attribute was a lookup table that was used by the Worker to make a 
decision about what action to take when presented with a particular situation.  The 
Rewards and Penalties attributes held a current tally of a Worker’s feedback from his 
organization.  These two values were used to calculate a Worker’s fitness.  Workers were 
rewarded for Completing Widgets and penalized for not Completing Widgets. 
The Skill values of the Worker were randomly assigned at instantiation, 
and remained static throughout a trial.  Even if a Worker was “killed” by the GA, the new 
Worker’s Skill attributes would be identical.  The possible values were randomly 
determined, but they were equally spaced to approximate a normal distribution of skill 
levels. 
The GA was applied to the Decision Table attribute to provide an 
adaptation mechanism.  The Rewards and Penalties attributes were reset to zero after 
each round of adaption by the GA.  The decision table contained every possible situation 




                                                 
27 Or that made the Organization think he had done so by Falsifying a Widget and not getting caught. 
28 Organizations were allowed to assign zero, one, two, or three Widgets, in any combination of types.  
For example, two type A Widgets and one type C Widget could be assigned, or zero Widgets, or three type 
B Widgets. 
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Table 5.   Worker Attributes 
Attribute Possible Values Purpose 
Skill_A {0, 0.11, 0.22, 0.33, 0.44, 
0.56, 0.67, 0.78, 0.89, 1} 
Represent a Worker’s ability to honestly 
Complete a Widget object of type “A” 
Skill_B {0, 0.11, 0.22, 0.33, 0.44, 
0.56, 0.67, 0.78, 0.89, 1} 
Represent a Worker’s ability to honestly 
Complete a Widget object of type “B” 
Skill_C {0, 0.11, 0.22, 0.33, 0.44, 
0.56, 0.67, 0.78, 0.89, 1} 
Represent a Worker’s ability to honestly 
Complete a Widget object of type “C” 
Decision 
Table 
Gene object29 A lookup table for the individual Worker that 
provides the decision to be made by the Worker 
given a particular situation 
Rewards {0 }value∩ ≤\  Holds the current value of the rewards given to a 
Worker by his Organization 
Penalties {0 }value∩ ≤\  Holds the current value of the penalties given to 
a Worker by his Organization 
 
3. The Organization 
The Organization object served a dual role as an agent and as a working 
environment.  The Organization was an agent whose actions affect the External 
Environment, but the Organization also had policies that affected the Worker objects and 
therefore these policies were effectively the environment in which Workers operated.  
This working environment will be referred to as the Work Environment.  The 
Organization provided opportunities for Workers to manipulate Widgets, and also 
provided feedback to the Workers.  Organization objects could buy Raw Widgets from 
the Market Environment and resell Widgets it perceived to be Complete. 
The fitness of an Organization was determined by the net monetary gain of that 
Organization.   Table 6 outlines the instances of gain or loss of money for an 
                                                 
29 A Gene object is a set of attributes that can be transformed by the GA.  The whole of the object can 
be represented as a binary string. 
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organization.  The three opportunities for a loss (or investment) of revenue were 1) when 
purchasing Raw Widgets, 2) when inspecting Complete Widgets, and 3) in the event that 
the Market Environment found a Falsified Widget.  The sole source of income for 
Organizations was the ability to resell Complete Widgets. 
Table 6.   Instances of Organization monetary flow 
Instance Flow Magnitude factors 
Buying a Raw Widget Loss Current market price is determined by the type of 
widget, and by the actions of other purchasing 
Organizations. 
Inspection of a Widget 
claimed to be Complete 
Loss Determined by a global constant for each Widget type 
multiplied by a global factor determined by the 
Organization’s inspection resolution policy  
Market Environment 
detects a Falsified 
Widget 
Loss Cost of an inspection as above, plus the price that the 
Widget sold for multiplied by 1.3 
Resale of a Complete30 
Widget 
Gain Price as set by the Organization’s policy 
Each Organization had three attributes, as listed in Table 7.  The monetary 
gains and losses were stored in these attributes, as was the Organization’s business 
decisions and policy. 
Table 7.   Organization attributes 
Attribute Possible Values Purpose 
Credits {0 }value∩ ≤\  Represents the sum of monetary gain 
Debt {0 }value∩ ≤\  Represents the sum of monetary loss 
Policy Gene object Provide business decisions/policy 
 
                                                 
30 As perceived by the Organization 
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The Policy attribute held many decisions that could be made by the Organization.  
The details of these decisions are contained in Table 8.  The freedom given to the 
Organizations with regard to policy, especially in the rewards and punishment structure, 
allowed the computer model to exhibit ethical ambivalence.  Therefore, the potential for 
agents to experience distress due to a misaligned rewards system, as required by Grover’s 
model, was achieved. 
The policy decisions that were not related to the rewards structures helped the 
Organizations behave like real organizations.  The Buy Decision and Buy Amount 
policies allowed the Organization to move between the three Widget markets.  If too 
many Organizations were buying Widgets from the Widget A market (raising the average 
loss to participating Organizations), the Organization had the freedom to exclusively or 
also purchase from the Widget B market, where there might have been less competition 
to buy and thus lower prices. 
The Resale Price attribute allowed the Organization to name a price for the resale 
of processed Widgets.  The Market Environment took bids of the Organizations and 
determined the quantity demanded in accordance with the basic economic principle of 
elastic demand31.  As with any free market, the price set by the Organization would not 
just be an arbitrary value32.  Organizations that set their prices very high would usually 
receive only a few purchases from the Market Environment33 and Organizations with the 
lowest prices had the greatest chance of selling each Widget.  This free market behavior 
                                                 
31 Generally, people will buy more of something (increase demand) when the price is lower.  People 
will buy less of something (decrease demand) as the price of a product rises (Sowell, 2007).  The sale of 
Raw Widgets to Organizations simulates a demand curve shift, and the resale of processed Widgets to the 
Environment simulates price elasticity of demand n > 1. 
32 The value of each Organization’s resale price is random during the first Year. 
33 An Organization that was a monopoly in a particular market could set a high price and still have 
enough demand for his product to make great revenue.  However, just as in real free markets with elastic 
demand curves (Sowell, 2007), the entrance of competitors into the market will motivate Organizations to 
lower their prices in order to sell their inventory of Widgets.  Organizations that didn’t lower their prices 
usually died from lack of revenue. 
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allowed the computer model to achieve a higher level of realism and to explore the 
higher-order effects of individual Worker and Organization actions34. 
The p(inspection) attribute defined the probability that a Completed Widget 
would be inspected by the Organization.  The cost of an inspection is shown in Figure 10.  
The Attribution Resolution, Lying Penalty, and Weight all contributed to the magnitude 
of the rewards and punishments given to Workers by Organizations according to Figure 
8.  The Attribution Resolution would determine how many Workers were penalized when 
a Falsified Widget was detected35.  While the Workers did not calculate expected 
payoffs, each Round they were subject to the expected payoffs shown in Figure 9. 
Falsification Detected
Failure to Complete a Widget
Widget percieved Complete
1 4Penalty  × Weight  + × Lying Penalty
Attribution Resolution Attribution Resolution
Penalty Weight
Reward Weight × 2




Figure 8: Penalty and reward equations based on the attributes of the Organization 
policy 
 
attempt_to_decieve(1) Widget percieved Complete Falsification Detected
honest_attempt Widget percieved Complete F
Expected Gain  = Reward p(inspection) Penalty
Expected Gain  = Reward Skill  (1-Skill) Penalty
− ×
× − × ailure to Complete a Widget
do_nothing Failure to Complete a WidgetExpected Gain  = Penalty
 
Figure 9: Expected Worker payoffs 
                                                 
34 In an early iteration in the development of the computer model, a centrally defined/coordinated 
price system was implemented.  This system was extremely hard to tune, because improperly set values 
would either cause Organizations to fail without question, or to flourish without regard for customer 
satisfaction or Worker behavior.  These problems, and the resultant success of the system when changed to 
an approximate free market, are congruent with the basic principles of economics according to Sowell 
(Sowell, 2007). 
35 The Attribution Resolution is directly proportional to the number of other Workers that will be 
penalized.  This represents an Organization’s ability or relative inability to determine the source of 
Falsification.  As more Workers are penalized, the penalty given to each worker is proportionally lower in 
magnitude. 
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Table 8.   Organization business and policy options 
* Each of these actually contains 3 individual instances, one for each of 
the Widget types: “A”, “B”, and “C” 
†Values in this range are in increment of 25 
‡Values in this cell have been rounded from four to two decimal places for 
readability 
Attribute Possible Values Purpose 
Buy 
Decision* 
Boolean Determine if a type of Raw Widget will 
be bid for 
Buy Amount* {0.06, 0.13, 0.19, 0.25, 0.31, 
0.38, 0.44, 0.50, 0.56, 0.63, 
0.69, 0.75, 0.81, 0.88, 0.94, 
1}‡ 
Used if Buy Decision is True.  When 
offered to buy a Raw Widget, this is the 
p(buy) to simulate a scalable quantity of 
Raw Widgets desired 
Resale Price* {25 51225}value∩ ≤ ≤] † The asking price for a Completed Widget 
p(inspection)* {0, 0.14, 0.29, .43, 0.57, 
0.71, 0.86, 1}‡ 
Probability that a Completed Widget will 
be inspected before resale 
Attribution 
Resolution* 
{0 7}value∩ ≤ ≤]  How finely a Falsified Widget can be 
traced back to an individual Worker, and 
helps determine how much a Worker who 




{0 7}value∩ ≤ ≤]  A factor that helps determine how much 
a Worker who is caught Falsifying a 
Widget will be penalized 
Rate of 
Assignment 
Single value from the set of 
all 20 possible combinations 
of assigning from 0 to 3 
Widgets 
How many Widgets, and of what type 
composition, will try to be assigned to 
each Worker 
Weight* {0 7}value∩ ≤ ≤]  A factor that determines how much a 
Worker will be rewarded or penalized for 
a Widget 
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4. The Market Environment 
The Market Environment object was the top-level object that contained all of the 
other objects and served as the operating environment of the Organization objects.  The 
Market Environment instantiated new Widgets and provided them to the Organizations 
for purchase.  The Market Environment also accepted the bids of Organizations that 
wished to resell Completed Widgets, and it could act as the “consumer” who might 
discover Falsified Widgets and return them to the Organization of origin for a refund. 
The Organization objects experienced the Market Environment through its 
attributes, listed in Table 9.  All of these values were held constant in experiments one 
and three.  
One of the Market Environment’s tasks was to instantiate new Widget objects.  
This was done each Day.  Just as milk will spoil if it is not processed quickly enough, 
Widgets were designed to spoil if they were not purchased and preserved by the 
Organizations.  Widgets were created at the rates defined in the Widget Renew Rates 
attribute.  Widgets that were not purchased spoiled after they exceeded the values stored 
in the Widget Max Spoil attribute.  The spoiling prevented Raw Widgets from piling up 
past a certain point.  In all experiments, this value was actually set to 0, which meant that 
Raw Widgets had only one chance to be purchased by an Organization. 
Each Day, the Organizations had the opportunity to inspect a portion of inventory 
to look for Falsified Widgets.  The Market Environment determined the expense of these 
inspections with the Inspection Costs and the Attribution Resolution Factors attributes.  
The Inspection Cost was a cost for all Organizations and was determined according to 
Figure 10.  Each Organization could determine the resolution they would attribute a 
Falsified Widget, but a greater resolution would cost the Organization more money each 
inspection.  The Attribution Resolution Factors attribute provided this factor.  The cost of 
an inspection was the Inspection Costs multiplied by the Attribution Resolution Factors.  
In the experiments, the Inspection Costs was 250, and the Attribution Resolution Factors 
ranged from one for the lowest resolution, to 4.5 for the highest. 
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inspectionCost  Attribution Resolution Factor  Inspection Cost= ×  
Figure 10: Cost of inspections 
Widgets were resold to the Market Environment as Completed also had a 
shelf life.  This is analogous to a gallon of milk that must be consumed within a certain 
amount of time.  The Widget Max Consumption defined the number of days after which a 
Widget would be removed from the Market Environment.  If Completed Widgets were 
not consumed, the demand for Completed Widgets would plummet, and Organizations 
would have to lower prices to a level below which they could not make a profit.  In the 
experiments, this value was set to zero, which meant that Widgets were consumed within 
one Day. 
After being resold to the Market Environment, Widgets might have been 
inspected.  This was to simulate the real-world “money back guarantee” that some 
businesses provide and the assumption that if an organization’s products are always 
broken, fewer people will purchase them.  Each Widget might be inspected with a 
p(inspection) equal to the Consumer p(detection) attribute.  In the experiments, this value 
was arbitrarily set at Consumer p(detection) = 0.5.  Manipulation of this variable was the 
focus of experiment two. 
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Table 9.   Market Environment attributes 
Attribute Possible Values Purpose 
Widget 
Renew Rates 
{0 }value∩ ≤]  Each time unit, this determines how many new 
Widgets are instantiated 
Widget Max 
Consumption  
{0 }value∩ ≤]  Each time unit, this determines the maximum 




{0 }value∩ ≤]  Each time unit, this determines the maximum 
Widget time_spoiling before a Widget is removed 
Inspection 
Costs 
{0 }value∩ ≤]  A factor in the cost to an Organization conducting 




8 numbers, each in 
the set 
{0 }value∩ ≤\  
A factor in the cost to an Organization conducting 
an inspection of Widgets of that type 
Consumer 
p(detection) 
{0 1}value∩ ≤ ≤\ The probability that a Falsified Widget will be 
detected after resale and returned for a refund 
D. THE GENETIC ALGORITHM 
The GA was used to provide Worker and Organization objects with the ability to 
adapt some of their attributes and behaviors.  The events of GA were contained within the 
Internal Environment.  The GA was performed on a grouping of subjects, called gene 
pools.  Each trial included three Organization gene pools and twelve Worker gene pools. 
1. Organization Gene Pools (Organizational Internal Environment) 
The Organizational Internal Environment was divided into three gene pools.  






fitness, but who have a tendency to homogenize the gene pool (Holland, 1992).  While 
some simulations desire this result36, the goal of this experiment is to evolve agents who 
work well together.   
To combat this homogenizing, Holland suggests an alteration of the original GA 
where fitness is not determined by the individual, but by the success of a group of rules 
(Holland, 1992).  This approach requires that success be Boolean, but the nature of this 
computer model not provide such a clean indicator of success.   
Holland’s alteration introduces segregation between agents, and so a simple 
segregation was imposed.  Separating the organizations into three sections did lead to 
superindividuals within each section, but the organizations were heterogeneous at the 
section-level.  Each section could be thought of as an independent entity that was made of 
four Organizations. 
a. Organization Gene Pool Parameters 
The length of an individual Organization binary string was 86 bits.  A 
single crossover per mating was used.  A constant population of Organizations was 
maintained so that the same Workers could be studied for the entire trial. 
The use of small population sizes with a high mutation rate has been 
studied by Randy Haupt, who found that populations of four, with a mutation rate of 0.15 
per bit, were most effective at finding global maximums in the fewest function calls 
(Haupt, 2000).  This was the reasoning behind the gene pool population of four 
Organizations with a mutation rate of 0.15.  A high mutation rate also helped to fight 
homogeneity. 
The Organization’s policies are very sensitive to changes in the binary 
string, so organizations that were selected for mating were allowed to survive to the next 
generation.  Each mating produced two offspring.  In most cases, this resulted one mating 
and the death of two organizations per generation.  Special cases where this did not 
happen will be discussed in the next sub-section. 
                                                 
36 Such as Axelrod’s iterated prisoner’s dilemma, where he sought the best strategy to the game. 
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b. Additional Organization Design Decisions 
In early testing and development of the computer model, all of the 
Organizations performed so poorly that they resorted to buying nothing, assigning 
nothing, and selling nothing.  Generations with every Organization’s fitness equal to zero 
emerged.  This may have been because from a random start, the policies of an 
Organization might not be suitable for a positive net monetary flow.  Some trials would 
develop Organizations that “figured it out” and broke out of debt, but in others, the 
Organizations seemed to just give up.  Since there was no penalty if everybody gave up, 
Organizations and Workers did not have much incentive to perform. 
The design was modified to incentivize performance.  To reach maturity 
(have a chance at mating), an Organization was required to have a fitness of greater than 
zero.  Any Organization with a fitness level of less than zero was killed.  If all 
Organizations were less than zero, the most fit would mate as usual.  If all fitnesses were 
equal to zero, matings were chosen at random.  If all were below zero, then selection was 
made normally. 
Under normal circumstances, all mates were required to be unique 
(Organizations could not exhibit asexual behavior).  However, if only one Organization 
survived to maturity, he was allowed to mate asexually and produce three offspring. 
This harsh additional selection mechanism more rapidly produced 
reasonable Organizational policies.  The high mutation rate also helped the Organizations 
find useful policy combinations. 
2. Worker Gene Pools (Co-Worker Internal Environments) 
The Co-Worker Internal Environments each contained one Worker gene pool, 
which was comprised of the eight co-Workers from the same Organization.  The length 
of an individual Worker binary string was 320 bits.  Due to the length of this binary 
string, three crossovers per mating were used.  The population size of eight was a 
compromise between the need for Organizations to have a good distribution of skill 
within its workforce, and the need to make the population size small and highly mobile.   
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Since the Workers’ genes are in more need of exploration than the Organizations’ genes, 
a much higher mutation rate, 0.35, was used.  This is the highest mutation rate 
recommended by Haupt’s study (Haupt, 2000). 
The same harsh selection mechanism that was used in the Organization 
gene pools was also used in the Worker gene pools.  In this gene pool, this mechanism 
also proved to help quickly develop the Workers into rational decision makers.  The 
criterion for asexual mating and random selection used in the Organization gene pools 
were used in the Worker gene. 
Each Worker had three static skill values, but his decisions were adaptive.  
Just as with the Organization gene pool, the tendency for the Worker gene pool to 
develop superindividuals was an issue.  This was a problem because the study aimed to 
evolve an individual decision table based on individual skill level.  It was found, 
however, that individually varying skill sets acted as a heterogeneous-seeking force in the 
gene pools.   
For example, it was common for a Worker with a low Skill_A to die and 
receive the offspring from a Worker with a high Skill_A.  This caused turbulence with 
the lesser skilled Worker, but after a few generations it was not uncommon for the lesser 
skilled Worker to receive a more compatible or advantageous set of genes.  Also, highly 
skilled Workers were not very disturbed when they became the recipient of the offspring 
of a lesser skilled Worker.  Since the aim of this study was not to develop probabilities of 
behavior, only to see if a difference in behavior between skill levels arose, this turbulence 
was accepted. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Worker was the focus of this thesis, and the design of the system was based 
around giving Worker agents opportunities to experience distress while acting out of self-
interest.  The self-interest requirement was met by allowing the Worker to not only 
honestly attempt to Complete Widgets, but by allowing the Worker to take no action, or 
to take a shortcut (Falsifying) that increases the chances of survival of the Worker but 
that might not be in line with the goal of the Organization. 
 50
Information about skill levels and decisions of each Worker allowed for an 
analysis of Grover’s hypothesis. 
The inclusion of the Organization agents was an essential part of creating a 
complex environment to approximate reality.  Organizations facilitated a complex and 
changing environment in which the Worker agents could adapt.  They also allowed for 
higher-order effects to propagate.  For example, if a Worker decided to Falsify a Widget, 
the Organization might sell that Widget.  If the Environment detected this Widget, it 
would provide negative feedback to the Organization.  The Organization might have to 
adapt or risk death.  This adaptation might have come in the form of increased 
inspections by the Organization, which in turn would have changed the Worker’s 
environment.  The Worker might then need to adapt or risk survival.   
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IV. VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND EXPERIMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will provide evidence to show that the computer model built in this 
thesis is both verified and valid.  Also, details of the experiments that were run to test the 
hypotheses of this thesis will be provided, and the data from each of the three 
experiments will be analyzed. 
B. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
This sub-section will provide supporting evidence that the MAS built in this thesis 
is verified and valid.  Specifically, this sub-section will show that the computer model 
demonstrates the complex and adaptive behavior that is characteristic of MASes.  By 
virtue of this demonstration, the process of the GA will also be validated, since the GA 
provided each agent the ability to adapt.  Additional trends in the data will be 
characteristic of an applied GA. 
1. Characteristics of MASes 
A Mutli Agent System produces complex and adaptive aggregate trends.  This 
sub-section will provide data from an experiment done by other researchers using 
MASes. 
The agents within a MAS adapt to the conditions of their environment.  To 
illustrate this adaptation, Edmonds’ 1999 experiment (where he modeled economic 
agents with bounded rationality) will be used. 
Figure 11 is a graph of an environmental aspect of this experiment.   It shows that 
there were two states of the environment, the easy state and the hard state. The easy state 
is represented by the curve that allows for very high utility often and at lower quantities 
of purchased products.  The easy state also has only one local maximum.  The hard state 
is represented by the curve that allows for very high utility only in certain areas of the 
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problem space, and also has two local maxima.  At any one time, only one of these 
environmental states may be active. 
 
Figure 11: Edmonds’ environment contained two states represented by the easy curve 
and the hard curve (Edmonds, 1999a) 
One part of Edmonds’ experiment was to begin the model with one environmental 
state and to then change the state of the environment.  Figure 12 shows the effect on 
individual utility when the environment began in the easy state and was then changed to 
the hard state at date 50.  Figure 13 shows the effect when the environment began in the 
hard state and was then changed to the easy state.   
It is important to notice how the system adapts and achieves a new equilibrium 
state when the environment changes.  In both figures, the agents found the global 
maximum of the easy state within the first 10 or so dates.  When the state of the 




Figure 12: Agents adapt from the easy state to the hard state (Edmonds, 1999a) 
 
Figure 13: Agents adapt from the hard state to the easy state (Edmonds, 1999a) 
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2. Demonstration of MAS Behavior in the Computer Model of this 
Thesis 
This sub-section establishes that the computer model built in this thesis 
demonstrates the characteristics of a MAS.  To achieve this, an environmental change 
was made between three permutations of a run. 
This change was to the Market Environment’s Widget Renew Rates attribute.  
This attribute was varied and run in three permutations: The first ran the model with 100 
Widgets of each type spawning per Day; the second only had 600 Widgets spawn each 
day; the third permutation had 1,100 Widgets spawn each Day.  This attribute affects the 
number of Widgets that can be purchased by any Organization, and in turn, the number of 
widgets that can be manipulated by Workers and then resold to the Environment for a 
profit. 
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Table 10.   Verification Experiment Market Environment attribute values 
Market Environment Attribute Values 
Widget Max Consumption  A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Widget Max Spoil A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Inspection Costs A: 250 B: 250 C: 250 
Consumer p(detection) A: 0.5 B: 0.5 C: 0.5 
Attribution Resolution Factors 0:1; 1:4.5; 2:4; 3:3.5; 4:3; 5:2.5; 
6:2; 7:1.5 
 
Table 11.   Verification Experiment independent Market Environment attribute 
Market Environment 
Attribute 
Permutation 1 Permutation 2 Permutation 3 
Widget Renew Rates A: 100 B: 100  
C: 100 
A: 600 B: 600  
C: 600 
A: 1100 B: 1100  
C: 1100 
Several parts of the model were observed: the Organization and Worker average 
fitnesses, the number of widgets sold, the price of Completed Widgets, the demand for 
Completed Widgets, and the average number of changes made each Year to the policy 
tables of the Organizations. 
The Market Environment was not changed during the run, but between 
permutations, key factors show significant change.  Those factors that did not change are 
also an indication of success.  A complete set of charts for this run is included in 
Appendix A, but the average Organization profits and the average price of resold Widgets 
will be examined in this section. 
Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16 chart the average Organization profits over 
time.  Profit is the net positive flow of money to an Organization.  In Figure 14, which 
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shows the situation where there are very few Widgets (100 per Day) in the Market 
Environment, shows how the average profit oscillates near 100,000 credits.  When the 
environment is changed to include more Widgets (600 per Day), as depicted in Figure 15, 
a significant increase in the net monetary gain of the Organizations was observed.  This 
demonstrates the computer models ability to adapt to and take advantage of the higher 
availability of Widgets.  Figure 16 shows another slight increase when the number of 
Widgets is made very high (1,100 per Day). 
 




























Figure 14: Verification permutation one (low number of Widgets) average 
organization profits over time 
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Figure 15: Verification permutation two (medium number of Widgets) average 
organization profits over time 




























Figure 16: Verification permutation three (high number of Widgets) average 
organization profits over time 
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Figure 17, Figure 18, and Figure 19 chart the average price of Widgets that were 
resold to the Market Environment.  These charts show two significant happenings.  First, 
it can be observed that generally, the price of resold Widgets in the Market Environment 
decreases over time.  This supports the verification of the free market economic functions 
of the computer model.  In a free market, the result of different firms competing in the 
same industry leads to lower prices for that industry (Sowell, 2007).   
The second observation is not very easy to determine without further analysis, but 
it appears that the rate of price decrease is diminishing as more Widgets are introduced 
into the Market Environment.  This might be due to the more fierce competition in an 
environment where resources are scarcer (Figure 17).  In the third permutation (Figure 
19), where 1,000 more Widgets per Day are introduced, the Organizations were able to 
purchase Raw Widgets cheaper and were therefore less desperate to recover losses.  
 




























Type A Type B Type C Average
 
Figure 17: Verification permutation one (low number of Widgets) average prices of 

































Type A Type B Type C Average
 
Figure 18: Verification permutation two (medium number of Widgets) average prices 
of resold Widgets over time 
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Type A Type B Type C Average
 
Figure 19: Verification permutation three (high number of Widgets) average prices of 
resold Widgets over time 
3. Demonstration of Genetic Algorithm Behavior in the Computer 
Model of this Thesis 
Indication of a working GA can be observed in Figure 20, Figure 21, and Figure 
22.  In GAs, the first generations result in very high numbers of changes to the binary 
strings of the individual.  This is due to the initial randomization of individual binary 
strings.  Individuals must quickly find ways to survive, and therefore there is a large 
amount of changing across the average individual.  Over time, individuals in a gene pool 
will begin to converge and become more homogenous, therefore reducing the number of 
differences between the individuals each generation. 
Since a change was made to the MAS, significant differences between Figure 20, 
Figure 21, and Figure 22 were not expected.  This supports a functional and valid GA. 
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Average Last 4 Years Average Last 1 Year Trend
 
Figure 20: Verification permutation one (low number of Widgets) average 
Organizational policy changes over time 


































Average Last 4 Years Average Last 1 Year Trend
 
Figure 21: Verification permutation two (medium number of Widgets) average 
Organizational policy changes over time 
 62


































Average Last 4 Years Average Last 1 Year Trend
 
Figure 22: Verification permutation three (high number of Widgets) average 
Organizational policy changes over time 
C. EXPERIMENTATION 
1. Overview 
Three experiments were conducted.  The first experiment ran the computer model 
with parameters that prevented workers from being monitored by the organizations to test 
Grover’s hypothesis.  The second experiment was identical to the first except that the 
organization feedback mechanism is varied to test the Davis Hypothesis.  The third 
experiment ran the model without these two constraints, which served as a comparison to 
a situation where behavior could be observed.  Each experiment was run for 10 trials. 
a. Experiment One:  Manipulation of the Organizations’ 
Attribution Resolution 
In an unaltered run of the computer model, each Organization would be 
able to set its own Attribution Resolutions, which would determine how precisely a 
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penalty was awarded upon the finding of a Falsified Widget.  A higher resolution factor 
would result in lower precision.  For example, if Worker #5 Falsifies a Widget and the 
resolution is two, then not only is Worker #5 penalized, but so are Worker #4 and Worker 
#6.  The penalty is also reduced by a factor of three in this instance.  If the resolution is 
one, then only Worker #5 is penalized, and without reduction.  A resolution of zero meant 
that no Worker would be penalized for lying. 
In this experiment, however, the Organizations’ Attribution Resolution 
was forced to be zero.  An Attribution Resolution equal to zero meant that a Worker 
could never be punished for lying. 
 
Table 12.   Experiment one Market Environment attribute values 
Market Environment Attribute Values 
Widget Renew Rates A: 600 B: 600 C: 600 
Widget Max Consumption  A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Widget Max Spoil A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Inspection Costs A: 250 B: 250 C: 250 
Consumer p(detection) A: 0.5 B: 0.5 C: 0.5 




Table 13.   Experiment one manipulated Organization variable 
Organization Attribute Value 
Attribution Resolution A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
 
b. Experiment Two:  Manipulation of the Market Environment’s 
Consumer p(detection) 
The feedback provided to Organizations that sold Falsified Widgets was 
determined in the Market Environment’s consumer detection phase (see Figure 7).  
Without this feedback, Organizations might not have been motivated to reduce the 
production and resale of Falsified Widgets. 
This experiment manipulated the Market Environment’s Consumer 
p(detection) attribute between zero, 50%, and 100%.  This effectively provided different 
magnitudes of feedback to the organizations in order to test the Davis Hypothesis. 
 
Table 14.   Experiment two Market Environment variables 
Market Environment Attribute Values 
Widget Renew Rates A: 600 B: 600 C: 600 
Widget Max Consumption  A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Widget Max Spoil A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Inspection Costs A: 250 B: 250 C: 250 




Table 15.   Experiment two independent Market Environment variables 
Market Environment 
Attribute 
Perm. 1 Perm. 2 Perm. 3 
Consumer p(detection) A: 0  B: 0  C: 0 A: 0.5 B: 0.5 C: 0.5 A: 1  B: 1  C: 1  
c. Experiment 3:  Unaltered Run 
The third experiment did not manipulate or vary any attributes.  The same 
Market Environment attributes were used as were used in experiment one.  This 
experiment allowed for the observation of an environment opposite to that of the Grover 
model and where Workers could not be caught and punished for lying.  In this 
experiment, Workers could be caught and they could be punished for lying, although the 
detection of a liar cost the Organizations money according to the inspection/attribution 
cost described in Chapter III. 
Table 16.   Experiment three Market Environment attribute values 
Market Environment Attribute Values 
Widget Renew Rates A: 600 B: 600 C: 600 
Widget Max Consumption  A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Widget Max Spoil A: 0 B: 0 C: 0 
Inspection Costs A: 250 B: 250 C: 250 
Consumer p(detection) A: 0.5 B: 0.5 C: 0.5 




2. Data Analysis 
Each of the experiments produced data of when Workers lied and the skill levels 
of the Workers.  The decisions were pooled into two categories: 1) Lied or 2) Did not lie.  
Lies were counted from the successful attempts at Falsifying Widgets37.  Counts for 
category two (Did not lie) were drawn from the remainder of the Worker’s actions.  
Data from each experiment was made into a contingency table and a Chi-Squared 
test was run to check for independence with an alpha of 0.01 (α=0.01).  The data was 
plotted against Worker skill level and against time to show strength and direction of 
relationships. 
a. Results of Experiment One:  Manipulation of the Organizations’ 
Attribution Resolution 
This experiment prevented Organizations from detecting or punishing 
Workers for deception.  The Chi-Squared null hypothesis for this experiment was that 
Workers’ skill levels and their decisions to 1) lie or 2) not lie were independent.  The 
alternative hypothesis was that Workers’ skill levels and their decisions to lie or not lie 
were related. 
The Chi-Squared test of the experiment one contingency table (Table 19) 
provides strong evidence that a Worker’s choice to lie or not lie is related to the Worker’s 
skill level when Organizations could not catch or punish lying Workers.  The Chi-
Squared critical value was 21.666 and the Chi-Squared statistic was 3737.377.  The 
resultant p-value was less than 0.001 (p-value < 0.001).  The null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
                                                 
37 A successful attempt is defined as an instance where the Worker’s intention to deceive resulted in a 
Widget being changed to the Falsified state. 
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Table 17.   Contingency table and Chi-Squared test for experiment one 
Contingency Table   
    
Skill Level Lied Did not Lie TOTAL 
0 24043 123165 147208 
0.11 30445 122109 152554 
0.22 28110 120284 148394 
0.33 23937 126010 149947 
0.44 26013 119343 145356 
0.56 23734 114810 138544 
0.67 25809 115015 140824 
0.78 22437 119399 141836 
0.89 18796 124231 143027 
1 23355 129437 152792 
TOTAL 246679 1213803 1460482 
    
chi-squared Stat  3737.377
df   9
p-value     0
chi-squared Critical   21.666
 
The weak negative relationship between skill level and Worker’s decisions 
to lie observed in Table 19 can more easily be seen in Figure 23: 
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Number of Lies Told Trend
 
Figure 23: Results of experiment one, number of lies told vs. Worker skill level 




























Number of Truths Told Trend
 
Figure 24: Results from experiment one, number of truths told vs. Worker skill level 
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Proportion of Truths Over Lies Trend
 
Figure 25: Results from experiment one, proportion of truths over lies told vs. 
Worker skill level 
Over time, Workers lied less frequently.  This was preceded by a brief 
initial trend of lying, as depicted in Figure 26.  An average frequency (skill-independent) 
is provided in Figure 27. 
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Day
0.00 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.78
0.89 1.00
 
Figure 26: Number of times Workers lied over time, by skill level in experiment one 
 71


































Average Maximum Minimum Trend
 
Figure 27: Average number of times Workers lied over time (averaged by skill level) 
in experiment one 
b. Results of Experiment Two:  Manipulation of the Market 
Environment’s Consumer p(detection) 
This experiment manipulated the amount of feedback that was given to 
Organizations.  This experiment also prevented Organizations from detecting or 
punishing Workers for deception.  Because this experiment was very similar to 
experiment one and because similar data was collected, data applicable to experiment one 
will also be presented in Appendix B. 
The first permutation of this experiment set the ability of the Market 
Environment to give Organizations negative feedback to zero.  After data collection, it 
was realized that the Davis hypothesis required a condition where non-zero negative 
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feedback was administered to the Organizations.  Therefore, the data collected from this 
permutation was not used to test the Davis hypothesis.  The results of this permutation 
were interesting; however, as there appeared to be a trend towards honesty as time 
progressed.  These results are provided in Appendix C. 
In this experiment, the Chi-Squared null hypothesis was that Workers’ 
decisions to lie or not lie were independent of the Market Environment’s Consumer 
p(detection) attribute magnitude.  The alternative hypothesis was that Workers’ decisions 
to lie or not lie were related of the Market Environment’s Consumer p(detection) attribute 
magnitude. 
The Chi-Squared test of the experiment two contingency table (Table 20) 
provides strong evidence that a Worker’s choice to lie or not lie was related to the 
Worker’s skill level when Organizations were allowed to catch and penalize lying 
Workers.  The Chi-Squared critical value was 6.634897 and the Chi-Squared statistic was 
35915.7.  The resultant p-value was less than 0.001 (p-value < 0.001).  The null 
hypothesis was rejected. 
 
Table 18.   Contingency table and Chi-Squared test for experiment two 
Contingency Table   
    
p(detection) Lied Did not Lie TOTAL 
0.5 246679 1213803 1460482 
1 122564 1209705 1332269 
TOTAL 369243 2423508 2792751 
    
chi-squared Stat  35915.7
df   1
p-value     0
chi-squared Critical   6.634897
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A strong negative relationship between the number of lies told and the 
magnitude of feedback is visible in Figure 28. 
























Number of Lies Told Trend
 
Figure 28: Results from experiment two, number of lies told vs. Market Environment 
feedback magnitude 
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There did not appear to be a relationship between the number of truths told 
and the Market Environment Consumer p(detection) attribute value in Figure 29. 
 


























Number of Truths Told Trend
 
Figure 29: Results from experiment two, number of truths told vs. Market 
Environment feedback magnitude 
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Number of Truths Told Trend
 
Figure 30: Results from experiment two, proportion of truths told over lies told vs. 
Market Environment feedback magnitude 
 
c. Results of Experiment Three:  Unaltered Run 
This experiment made no alterations to the computer model.  
Organizations were allowed to attempt to detect deception and punish Workers 
accordingly. 
The Chi-Squared null and alternative hypotheses for this experiment were 
identical to the null and alternative hypotheses in experiment one. 
The Chi-Squared test of the experiment 3 contingency table (Table 21) 
provides strong evidence that a Worker’s choice to lie or not lie was related to the 
Worker’s skill level when Organizations were allowed to catch and penalize lying 
Workers.  The Chi-Squared critical value was 21.666 and the Chi-Squared statistic was 
3226.733.  The resultant p-value was less than 0.001 (p-value < 0.001).  The null 
hypothesis was rejected. 
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Table 19.   Contingency table and Chi-Squared test for experiment three 
Contingency Table   
    
Skill Level Lied Did not Lie TOTAL 
0 21600 154550 176150 
0.11 18819 155462 174281 
0.22 17031 126315 143346 
0.33 15301 138032 153333 
0.44 15232 135209 150441 
0.56 14505 151525 166030 
0.67 14795 130030 144825 
0.78 15195 157390 172585 
0.89 13305 149960 163265 
1 11205 120613 131818 
TOTAL 156988 1419086 1576074 
    
chi-squared Stat  3226.733
df   9
p-value     0
chi-squared Critical   21.666
 
The weak negative relationship between skill level and Worker’s decisions 
to lie observed in Table 21 can more easily be seen in Figure 31: 
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Number of Lies Told Trend
 
Figure 31: Results of experiment three, number of lies told vs. Worker skill level 




























Number of Truths Told Trend
 
Figure 32: Results of experiment three, number of truths told vs. Worker skill level 
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Proportion of Truths Over Lies Trend
 
Figure 33: Results from experiment three, proportion of truths over lies told vs. 
Worker skill level 
Over time, Workers lied less frequently.  This was preceded by a brief 
initial trend of lying, as depicted in Figure 34.  An average frequency (skill-independent) 
is provided in Figure 35. 
 79
 












0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Day
0.00 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.78
0.89 1.00
 
Figure 34: Number of times Workers lied over time, by skill level in experiment three 
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Day
Average Maximum Minimum Trend
 
Figure 35: Average number of times Workers lied over time (averaged by skill level) 





1. Experiment One:  Manipulation of the Organizations’ Attribution 
Resolution 
The results of this experiment support Grover’s hypothesis 3a: Individual job skill 
will be negatively associated with lying to agents of the organization.  Workers in the 
computer model lied less frequently as their skill increased, and the null hypothesis of 
independence was rejected. 
2. Experiment Two:  Manipulation of the Market Environment’s 
Consumer p(detection) 
The results of this experiment support the Davis Hypothesis: In an environment 
where 1) an organization and its members are independently self-interested, 2) the 
organization receives merited negative feedback from its environment, and 3) workers 
cannot be observed or punished for lying, the frequency of organization members lying 
will be inversely proportional to the magnitude of that feedback.   Workers in the 
computer model lied less frequently as their Organizations were subjected to higher 
levels of negative feedback for producing Falsified Widgets, and the null hypothesis of 
independence was rejected. 
The results of this experiment also support Grover’s hypothesis 3a.  Workers in 
the computer model lied less frequently as their skill increased. 
3. Experiment Three:  Unaltered Run 
The results of this experiment support Grover’s hypothesis 3a in an environment 
where organizations can detect and punish liars.  This suggests that the predictions of 
Grover’s 3a hypothesis might be independent of an organization’s negative actions 
towards liars.  The null hypothesis of independence was rejected in this experiment. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Davis hypothesis needs further testing.  Time constraints prevented more 
permutations to be examined, and data should be collected for longer time periods to 
check for oscillations.  While the statistical analysis supported the Davis hypothesis, 
more data points need to be tested to check for a non-linear relationship.  
The computer model in this thesis only tested one of Grover’s ten hypotheses.  
The biggest limitation of this computer model was that peer agents were not allowed to 
interact with each other, i.e. Worker agents could not interact with other Worker agents.  
To explore many of Grover’s hypotheses, a computer model that allows for peer 
interaction would be needed. 
Other models that might attempt to study this subject would probably not need 
such a complicated model.  The use of the GA on the behavior adaptation of the agents in 
this model added a great deal of complexity, but a good approach might also be agents 
whose behaviors were adapted by a simple scoring mechanism.  Each agent could have 
three possible behaviors: lie, be honest, or do nothing, and the behavior with the highest 
score would be the behavior that the agent actually performed.  A difficulty with this 
approach, however, is that in order to score behaviors that were not actually performed, 
the agent would be required to make some hypothetical determination of what the score 
would have been, had he been acting on the other possible behavior.  That is why the GA 
is so useful: it does not require a determination of what could have been, only on what 
worked or did not work. 
In order to capture the emergent behaviors that were observed, such as the 
average reduction of deceivers, even when no direct feedback occurs, the computer 
model must maintain a certain level of complexity.  This observation might not have been 
made if, in this computer model, only the Worker agents were allowed to adapt.  On the 
other hand, an interesting experiment would be to test if a co-evolving hierarchical 
architecture is required to achieve this behavior.  Much of the other research with social 
rationality has been done with simple agents in simple environments. 
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The luxury of working with a computer model is that it never forgets.  Many 
times during development and testing, unexpected data would be returned.  The first 
instinct is to blame the computer. When development was approached carefully and 
incrementally, however, most of the time these unexpected returns were found to be 
correct and logical.  The bug in the loop was human, not computer.  On the other hand, 
the pains of working with computers are also present.  Any software developer knows the 
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APPENDIX A:  OTHER VERIFICATION CHARTS 
Figure 36, Figure 37, and Figure 38 plot the same data as was presented in the 
Verification section, but here the data is not averaged. 




























Cluster 1 Custer 2 Cluster 3
 
Figure 36: Verification permutation one average Organization profits by cluster over 
time 
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Cluster 1 Custer 2 Cluster 3
 
Figure 37: Verification permutation two average organization profits by cluster over 
time 




























Cluster 1 Custer 2 Cluster 3
 
Figure 38: Verification permutation three average organization profits by cluster over 
time 
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The average Worker fitness over time (Figure 39, Figure 40, and Figure 41) do 
not show much change because Workers were somewhat insulated from the Market 
Environment. 
 
















Figure 39: Verification permutation one average Worker fitness over time 
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Figure 40: Verification permutation two average Worker fitness over time 
















Figure 41: Verification permutation three average Worker fitness over time 
 89
Widget demand was proportional to the number of Widgets that were available 
for resale. 
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Figure 42: Verification permutation one average consumer demand of resold Widgets 
over time 
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Type A Type B Type C
 
Figure 43: Verification permutation two average consumer demand of resold Widgets 
over time 





























Type A Type B Type C
 
Figure 44: Verification permutation three average consumer demand of resold 
Widgets over time 
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APPENDIX B:  DATA GATHERED FROM EXPERIMENT TWO 
THAT IS APPLICABLE TO EXPERIMENT ONE 
The following data is applicable to experiment one and was collected for the 
permutation where the Market Environment’s Consumer p(detection) was equal to one.  
The Chi-Squared test of the experiment two, permutation three contingency table (Table 
22) provides strong evidence that a Worker’s choice to lie or not lie is related to the 
Worker’s skill level when Organizations cannot catch or punish lying Workers.  The Chi-
Squared critical value was 21.666 and the Chi-Squared statistic was 689.6626.  The 
resultant p-value was less than 0.001 (p-value < 0.001). 
 
Table 20.   Contingency table and Chi-Squared test for experiment two, permutation three 
Contingency Table   
    
Skill Level Lied Did not Lie TOTAL 
0 13751 130323 144074 
0.11 12110 104315 116425 
0.22 11817 114926 126743 
0.33 11540 126120 137660 
0.44 11069 117615 128684 
0.56 12786 115810 128596 
0.67 13826 130523 144349 
0.78 12830 129315 142145 
0.89 11818 116270 128088 
1 11017 124488 135505 
TOTAL 122564 1209705 1332269
    
chi-squared Stat  689.6626
df   9
p-value     0
chi-squared Critical   21.666
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Number of Lies Told Trend
 
Figure 45: Number of lies told vs. Worker skill level, experiment two, permutation 
three 




























Number of Truths Told Trend
 
Figure 46: Number of truths told vs. Worker skill level, experiment two, permutation 
three 
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Proportion of Truths Over Lies Trend
 
Figure 47: Proportion of truths over lies told vs. Worker skill level, experiment two, 
permutation three 
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APPENDIX C:  DATA GATHERED FROM EXPERIMENT TWO, 
PERMUTATION ONE 
Since this data tested a situation where negative feedback was not provided to the 
Organizations, it did not apply to the Davis hypothesis and was therefore not included in 
the testing of the Davis hypothesis.  This data still showed trends of decreasing frequency 
of deceit, however. 
 

























Number of Lies Told Trend
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Number of Truths Told Trend
 


























Proportion of Truths Over Lies Trend
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Average Maximum Minimum Trend
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This chart shows that truths became more prevalent, but data might need to be 
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